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lodi nauta
11 The Consolation: the Latin
commentary tradition, 800–1700
introduct ion
‘There is nothing superfluous in such a perfect work as theConsolation
written by such a perfect philosopher as Boethius.’1 These words,
written by the twelfth-century master William of Conches, express
a sentiment which was almost universally shared by readers and
commentators in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. The popularity
of theConsolationwas immense, in fact almost unparalleled. It was
translated into different vernacular languages from an early time
onwards, which ensured an unusually wide readership, in which
every stratum of society is represented: kings and queens, the nobil-
ity, monks, clerics, university teachers, school masters, and lay
men and women.2 As a school text it was glossed by thousands of
school teachers, and though it did not find a fixed and permanent
place in the university curriculum, it was also frequently studied
at this highest level. In this chapter we shall study some aspects of
its reception, focusing on the Latin commentary tradition.3 It goes
without saying that this can only be done in a highly selective way.
There is a huge number of commentaries and glossed copies of the
text, and many of them still await a first inspection. Courageous
attempts are now being made to catalogue all the manuscripts, and
to study and edit sets of glosses and commentaries.4 This has
resulted in a much fuller but also much more complicated picture
of the reception of the Consolation. Scholars have come to realise
that the modern notion of a text written by one single author is
hardly of use in charting traditions of fluent texts such as glosses and
commentaries. They were often considered to be common property,
and each commentator took from older works what fitted his
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purpose or suited his interests. The survey presented below can
therefore only be a rough and provisional one.
A major challenge for any commentator who took his (or perhaps
in a few cases ‘her’) job seriously was the absence of overtly Christian
teaching in the Consolation. Boethius was universally and rightly
believed to be the author of some important theological treatises. So
the 64,000-dollar question was: why had he opted for a consolation
by reason rather than by faith at the end of his life? Modern scholars
may rightly point out that there is nothing in the text that would
have been unacceptable to a Christian in Boethius’ time (nor, for
that matter, to a Neo-Platonist of a rationalistic stamp),5 but such a
historical perspective was generally not available to the medieval
reader, who was rather worried by the presence of Platonic, hetero-
dox opinions (such as the pre-existence of the soul and its descent
through heavenly spheres to an earthly body) as much as by the
absence of citations from the Bible or clear allusions to the person
of Christ and Christian faith. But creative reading was the medieval
scholars’ strong point, and they developed various methods to
solve this hermeneutical knot. This will be a major theme in what
follows.
Another major theme in the Consolation concerns Boethius’
attempt to reconcile divine Providence with human free will in
Book 5. He guides the reader through a series of connected problems
such as causal determinism (everything seems to be ruled by fate) and
divine prescience, which seems to be incompatible with the contin-
gency of events. In solving these ‘knotty problems’ he introduces
distinctions which became stock elements in the medieval debates
on these themes: fate and providence, God’s providentia and praevi-
dentia, four levels of understanding, two kinds of necessity (simple/
absolute and conditional), eternity and sempiternity. He develops the
notion that knowledge is dependent on the capabilities of the knowing
subject rather than on the thing known, and the notion of God’s
atemporal eternity (tota simul), arguing that God’s infallible mode of
knowing things is compatible with their contingent outcome, even
though this seems to be impossible from the humble, human, point
of view.6 Medieval logicians and philosophers often quoted the
Consolation but went much further in developing their own logical
tools to attack the problems. Commentators, on the other hand, usu-
ally stuck closely to the text, but we shall see that occasionally they
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drew, if their ambitions went beyond textual exegesis, on contempo-
rary terminology and debates.
the early medieval per iod
After Alcuin of York had introduced the text in the late eight century,
the Consolation was soon intensively read in the monasteries and
cathedral schools of the Carolingian Empire. Apart from an influen-
tial treatise on the metrical forms by Lupus of Ferrières from the mid
ninth century, the two most important groups of commentaries are
associated with the Anonymous of St Gall and Remigius of Auxerre.
The first seems to be represented in a series of MSS dating from the
late ninth to the early eleventh century, and comprising at least four
different forms: (a) a corpus of marginal and interlinear glosses, (b) a
more expansive version in the form of a single continuous commen-
tary, (c) a shorter version of the previous item, and (d) stray glosses
mixed with Remigian material.7 The Remigian tradition is the dom-
inant one in early medieval Europe, with some forty MSS ascribed to
Remigius of Auxerre and his revisers. Remigius’ commentary, prob-
ably composed in the early years of the tenth century, was soon
revised by other glossators, both on the Continent and the British
Isles. Different versions have been distinguished, but the precise
details of their dissemination remain difficult to unravel, since com-
mentators copied freely from each other, omitting, adding and revi-
sing as they deemed fit. In addition to these two groups or traditions,
there are a number of other commentaries, which seem independent
from them, though to what extent is still often an open question.
There is, for instance, an interesting commentary in the Vatican
library, containing glosses dating from different periods.8 A number
of them are by a Welsh hand, and seem to predate Remigius’ com-
mentary; it has even be suggested that they are in the hand of Asser,
who is said by William of Malmesbury to have aided King Alfred in
translating theConsolation into Old English; other glosses in thisMS
have been attributed to Dunstan from the mid tenth century. Here
too, a number of questions remain unsolved.
Though there is an enormous variation in glosses, commentators
pursued a common aim, namely to clarify the meaning of the text by
explaining words and grammatical constructions, and by providing
some background information of Boethius’ allusions to Roman
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history and politics, mythological lore and the natural world. This
textual explanation served the wider goal of giving the text its proper
place in the liberal arts curriculum by linking it to other texts, both
pagan and Christian. The Consolation gave vivid expression to the
belief that the cosmos, created by God out of pure goodness, is a copy
of the divine original and hence bears the stamp of the divine,
rational, plan. Since the human soul, as an image of God, is among
created things closest to its creator, it would be able to learn the
structure and plan of the cosmos were it not hampered by the impedi-
ments of the body – an inheritance of Adam’s sin. By climbing the
stairs of the liberal arts, however, men can overcome their fallen
state and come to learn the structure of the cosmos and its creator.
Study of such texts as Boethius’ Consolation, Plato’s Timaeus,
Martianus Capella’sOn the Marriage of Philology and Mercury, and
Macrobius’On the Dream of Scipio, was often only the beginning of
the way upwards towards evangelical perfection, and needed to be
complemented by Christian teaching and education. This is of course
not to say that these texts were solely studied with this aim in mind.
They were also studied for their mythological and historical lore, and
for their natural philosophical contents, as for instance advanced
astronomical diagrams inmanuscripts of some of these texts testify.9
But early medieval readers could confidently believe that especially
the Consolation, written by a devout Christian, was essentially
in agreement with Christian teaching, indeed is just another formu-
lation of it. Some revisers of Remigius may even have used the
Consolation as a source book for exempla to be used in sermons and
devotional literature.10
However, not all commentators shared the same conviction that
the entire text could be so easily coordinatedwith Christian teaching.
In particular the hymn ‘O qui perpetua’ (3.m9), based on Plato’s
mythological account of the creation of the world and the soul in
his Timaeus, could lead to feelings of uneasiness. Boethius here
clearly refers to the Platonic notion of the soul’s pre-existent life,
and writes that God had each soul allotted to a star, a light chariot
(levis currus), for its companion fromwhich it descended at its appro-
priate time into a body. The soul’s perfect knowledge was lost upon
embodiment, but ‘a seed of truth’ (semen veri) remained, and by
kindling this seed through study of the liberal arts the soul could
regain that perfect knowledge: knowledge therefore is recollection
258 lodi nauta
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/181447/WORKINGFOLDER/MRB/9780521872669C11.3D 259 [255–278] 18.12.2008 11:58AM
(3.m6, m9 and m11, 5.m4). This cluster of passages thus formed the
litmus test for any commentator. According to the Anonymous of
St Gallen this terminology of ‘light chariots’ must be taken meta-
phorically: Boethius speaks in the manner of a pagan here (gentili
more loquitur),11 but he is nevertheless assured of Boethius’
Christianity. Remigius of Auxerre is less hesitant and writes that
Augustine held a similar opinion about the soul’s descent. After
giving a survey of some other opinions, he argues that the souls’
‘chariots’ can be interpreted as ‘the subtle contemplation and intel-
lect by which God directs man to the heavenly order (caelestem
conservationem).12 Other commentators were less willing to bend
‘the waxen nose of the authority’ in the desired direction (to use the
famous image of the twelfth-century theologian Alan of Lille),
though most would not go so far as the monk Bovo of Corvey from
the late ninth century, who roundly declared that Boethius’ words
were ‘monstrous comments’ (monstruosa commenta) and that the
Platonic doctrines were nothing but ‘most inane fables’ (inanissi-
mae fabulae).13 Since Boethius’ intention was to discuss the doc-
trines of the philosophers and not ecclesiastical doctrine, the
Consolation was often ‘contrary to faith’, says Bovo.
will iam of conches
The commentaries from this earlier period were usually written in
the form of interlinear and marginal glosses. A more thorough and
systematic exegesis of ancient texts became prominent in the schools
in the late eleventh century, and hence commentaries developed into
more systematic and comprehensive readings. They often obtained a
certain independence from the authorial text and could circulate as
autonomous works. An important proponent of this development is
William of Conches, author of commentaries on Boethius, Priscian,
Plato and Macrobius, as well as of two systematic works on natural
philosophy.14 William’s work is a blend of tradition and innovation
both in its glossing technique and in its contents. Like his predeces-
sors William does not comment on each and every phrase, and passes
over long sections from Boethius’ text in silence. Yet on thewhole his
approach is much more systematic and comprehensive. He usually
starts with a lemma, placing it in the wider context of the argument
and then descending to the level of explanation of words.
The Latin commentary tradition, 800–1700 259
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William is also innovative in using the commentary for developing
new areas of knowledge, in particular in the field of natural philoso-
phy, but here too the difference between his and earlier texts is one of
degree rather than of kind. William intersperses his glosses with long
digressions on natural philosophical themes such as the elements,
winds and planets, convinced as he is that theConsolation embodies
profound truths which have to be clarified with the aid of all possible
branches of learning. Hence, the commentary already shows all
the hallmarks of William’s daring reading of the cosmos secundum
physicam. As such it is a typical product of the early twelfth century
when scholars began systematically to study the natural world along
rational and physical lines.
Connected to this is William’s interpretation of Boethius’
Platonism. Here too we find the same blend of tradition and innova-
tion. He shares the Christianizing tendencies of his predecessors, but
leaves them far behind in originality and audacity. Drawing on the
literary theory of fabula derived from Cicero, Macrobius and Isidore,
according to which truths can be found beneath the veil (integumen-
tum or involucrum) of fabulous narratives, William searched for
profound truths behind the veil of pagan fictions and fables.15 Such
an integumental readingwas applied to several types of texts.Wemay
distinguish the following ‘functions’:
(1) It could be a vehicle for the Christianization of (a) paganmyths
and philosophy, and (b) fabulous narratives with possible base
and improper elements. Christianization often means moral-
ization, neutralizing possible heterodox, base or improper ele-
ments. Examples of (a) are the Platonic account of the origin
and descent of the soul, the notion of knowledge through
recollection, and the concept of the World Soul. Examples of
(b) are the fables of Orpheus (3.m12), Ulysses and his comrades
(4.m3), and the labours of Hercules (4.m7). Thus the souls’
chariots, for instance, in Boethius’ ‘O qui perpetua’ are identi-
fied with reason and intellect, because they bring the soul to
knowledge of heavenly and earthly things, or, alternatively,
with the stars, since it is by stellar influence that the soul can
live in the body.16
(2) This accommodation of pagan myth and metaphor to
Christian dogma, however, could put that dogma into a new
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light: the dogma could become ‘infected’ by association with
the pagan notion: the prime example is William’s identifica-
tion of the PlatonicWorld Soul with theHoly Spirit (3.m9), by
which the World Soul was not only absorbed into Christian
thinking, but also exerted its influence on discussions about
the precise status and nature of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity
in general.17 The integumentum could lead to a reconsidera-
tion of the established reading, but admittedly this was often
an unintentional effect.18
(3) Unlike in (1) where ‘deviant’ texts were ‘domesticated’, an
integumental reading could also be used to challenge estab-
lished readings of texts or events. InWilliam’s works this often
takes the form of rationalistic–naturalistic readings of biblical
passages (the creation of man from warm mud, the formation
of Eve, the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise, all of
whichwere interpreted byWilliam in a naturalistic way). This
demythologization or profanation of sacred truths may seem
to be different from the search for veritas beneath pagan fables
by having recourse to integumenta, but for William the differ-
ence did not seem to be so fundamental.19 When faced with
ecclesiastical opposition, William was willing to recant and
accept the conventional and established readings of these pas-
sages, but this did not diminish his belief in the correctness of
his approach; he even offered a new piece of naturalistic
explanation of Adam’s expulsion from Paradise.20
William is less original in his exegesis of the major themes of
Book 5 on God’s providence and human free will. But it is easy to
overlook William’s achievement here. He is the first commentator
who gives a fair synopsis of the complicated text, taking care not to
lose sight of the drift of the argument. And while he generally stays
close to the text, on a few occasions he draws on contemporary
terminology and debates. For instance, Boethius argues that, as soon
as one realizes that knowledge is dependent on the capacities of the
knowing subject rather than on the object known, it will become
clear that one and the same object may be viewed from different
perspectives, and that God may (fore)see events which in themselves
are not necessary, in his eternal and immutable gaze. William here
quotes from Boethius’ commentary on Porphyry where a distinction
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is made between ‘an understanding by conjunction’ (as in ‘man is an
animal’) and ‘an understanding by abstraction or division’ (as when a
line is conceptually abstracted from a body, though it cannot exist
separately from it). Abelard makes use of the same Boethian distinc-
tion, distinguishing between two different senses of ‘I understand a
thing otherwise than it is’:21 (a) themind abstractswhen it attends just
to one aspect of something, for example when I regard a man only as
substance or only as a body, without implying that man consists only
of substance or only of body (‘otherwise’ qualifying ‘I understand’), and
(b) the mind regards the nature of a thing different from its true being,
for example when I regard man’s nature as being only substance or
only body (‘otherwise’ qualifying ‘than the thing is’). Only in the latter
case would I be mistaken. The same sort of distinction is applied by
William toGod’s knowledge: God understands things differently from
what they are, since he sees them ‘as immutable and invariable, even
though they aremutable and variable’, but this does notmean that his
knowledge is erroneous.22 God’s infallibility does not entail the nec-
essary outcome of events and acts of free will.
In the last paragraphs of the commentary William discusses
the syllogism ‘What God foresees, it is necessary to occur; but God
foresees everything. So it is necessary that everything occurs’ (Quod
deus providet, necesse est evenire; sed deus cuncta providet. Ergo
necesse est cuncta euenire).23 Having refuted two current explana-
tions, William proceeds to give his own interpretation, which makes
use of a distinction between ‘split’ or ‘cut’ (incisus) versus ‘non-split’
or ‘uncut’ (non incisus) syllogisms. The first is defined as a syllogism
which consists of a modal major premise, a ‘simple’ (i.e. non-modal)
minor and a ‘simple’ conclusion. The ‘non-split’ or ‘uncut’ syllogism
consists of only modal or only simple statements. William’s sugges-
tion seems to be that we can only derive a simple conclusion (‘it will
occur’), rather than the modal one (‘it will necessarily occur’), from
this syllogism since the major is split into two parts of which one is
stated in the minor premise (‘God foresees everything’) and one part
in the conclusion (‘it will happen’). It may seem that William has
allowed the modal operator to vanish into thin air, but unfortunately
the text is too brief, and may even be corrupt, in order to assess his
interpretation. But what is interesting is thatWilliam here introduces
a distinction which must have been a very recent addition to the
philosopher’s armoury. We find another early use of it in Abelard’s
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Logica ingredientibus (dated 1118–20), which is exactly contempo-
rary with William’s commentary. Abelard was probably misled by
such a phrase as Initium primae incisionis, which is found in some
MSS of the Latin translation of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics; incisio is
the Latin rendering of theGreekword τμñμα, whichwas the technical
term for dividing books in the Aristotelian corpus.24 The phrase
caught up in logical treatises from the twelfth century, but at first
there may not have been a standard interpretation of it, which is not
surprising in view of the difficulty of Aristotle’s modal logic and the
fact that the Prior Analytics was only beginning to be studied in the
Latin West in this period. Thus Abelard’s example consists of two
modal premises and a non-modal conclusion; later texts take such a
syllogism to consist of a modal major premise, a non-modal minor,
and a modal conclusion, according to Aristotle’s own discussion in
his Prior Analytics (I.9–10, 15 and 21), without using such a term
however.25 It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss
William’s exegesis of Book 5 any further, but it may be said that as a
whole it is an impressive piece of work, which for the first time pays
careful attention to the overall structure of the argument.
William’s work became the standard commentary during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. His own work survives in at least
seventeen MSS, and a thirteenth-century revision in at least eleven
MSS.26 In addition there is a great number of manuscripts which
contain ‘Conchian’ material, for instance commentaries in the form
of compilations in which parts of William’s work are mixed with
other (Remigian) commentaries, and the marginal commentary that
accompanies the Latin text of the Consolation and Jean de Meun’s
translation, Li Livres de Confort de Philosophie.27 But whileWilliam’s
commentary, in one form or another, was widely copied or exploited,
there are a number of MSS with glosses or commentaries which are
independent fromhis.Herewe enter a terra incognita. Further research
into these and other anonymous MSS must also verify the impression
that the thirteenth century was relatively uninterested in Boethius’
masterpiece.28
n icholas trevet
In the fourteenth century William’s dominant position was taken
over by the Dominican scholar Nicholas Trevet, whose commentary
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dates from around 1300. It became the late medieval commentary par
excellence. More than a hundred MSS have survived, not counting
various kinds of adaptations, usually made for teaching purposes. It is
not difficult to see why medieval readers appreciated Trevet’s work,
even thoughmodern scholars have been slow to recognize its value: it
is comprehensive, highly organized, clear, and on thewhole scholarly
and judicious.29 Trevet lived at a time when the Dominicans were
engaged in a reasoned, undogmatic defence of Thomistic positions,
and it comes as no surprise to see him using Aristotelian–Thomistic
positions in order to clarify Boethius’ text, in particular on cognition
and free will. This does not mean, as has often been maintained,
that he was hostile towards Boethius’ Platonism. Like William of
Conches, he did not doubt seriously that behind Plato’s words a
‘sane’ (sanus), acceptable philosophy was to be found. As Trevet
reminded his readers several times, Plato often transmitted his phi-
losophy in fables and metaphors, in the manner of ancient theolo-
gians, and ‘therefore Boethius, particularly in his metres, where he is
retaining the poetic style, uses Platonic terms, which are acceptable
with a reasonable understanding (sano intellectu)’.30 Far from being
unsympathetic to this figurative way of speaking, Trevet follows
Macrobius in fully accepting as legitimate the category of fabulous
narratives which proceed by ‘honest words’ and which are the prop-
erty of philosophers. He cites Boethius’ myth of Orpheus, Plato’s
myth of Er and Cicero’s account of Scipio’s dream as examples, and
his interpretation of the Platonic account of the soul clearly seems to
imply that Plato’s fabulaemust be placed in this category too.
Just likeWilliam of Conches, who spoke about ‘adapting’ (adaptare)
the controversial literal meaning (littera) of the text to an acceptable,
deeper meaning (sententia),31 Trevet too speaks of explaining the
literal account in terms of an acceptable interpretation of the passage.
His explanations of the various passages where Boethius alludes to
souls descending into bodies and losing their knowledge on account
of their embodiment show that he is aware that some hermeneutic
force has to be used to coordinate the controversial littera to an accept-
able sententia. But while the modern reader may feel uneasy at such a
‘twisting’, the medieval commentator saw nothing strange or unnatu-
ral in it (or did not even recognize it as ‘twisting’), used as he was to
distinguishing between twomeanings, a literal and a figurative one, or
more. Thus when Boethius talks about the loss of the soul’s perfect
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knowledge upon embodiment (‘the soul who is not totally forgetful of
itself’, 5.m3), Trevet explains, he is echoingAquinas’ teaching, that the
soul has a twofold being – connected to the body and separated from it –
and, correspondingly, a twofoldway of knowing. In the embodied state,
the soul must have recourse to phantasms; in the disembodied state,
the soul receives forms from God by which it attains knowledge. The
disembodied state is less natural and less perfect than the embodied
state; yet in another way it comes prior to it, because in this state the
soul is immaterial form (forma immaterialis), not the corporeal form
(forma corporis), and hence knowledge is not dependent on the bodily
senses. Having presupposed these things (hiis suppositis), Trevet
writes, one can construe the literal sense accordingly (expone litteram
sic).32 At the end of this passage Trevet must admit, however, that
those who take Boethius here to treat souls as descending into bodies
and losing their knowledge on account of their embodiment have the
littera on their side, and yet the sententia will be false.33
In his commentary on 3.m9 Trevet’s explanation comes close to
William’s. The star, which is said by Boethius to be the soul’s chariot,
can mean the soul’s immortal power, by means of which, when the
body has been dissolved, the soul flies out from it. Alternatively, it
can mean ‘the cultivation of devotion and justice, by reason of which
the soul is carried up to heaven after the dissolution of the body’.34
And Boethius’ next verse about God dispersing the souls in the heav-
ens and on earth should not be understood in the Platonic way, but
they are said to be sown on the face of heaven because of the power
acquired from heaven, from which the union of soul with body
derives its period. The soul’s heavenly home and its companion star
are interpreted in terms of the mediating influence of the stars on the
union of soul and body and the duration of that union.
What the glosa ordinaria was for biblical commentators Trevet’s
workwas for commentators on theConsolation, andwe find hiswork
in countless MSS either in its original format or in the form of glosses
extracted from the larger work, sometimesmixed with Remigian and
Conchian glosses. Other commentators such as Pseudo-Thomas,
William Wheteley and Tholomaeus de Asinariis clearly built on
Trevet’s work, shortening, revising and simplifying it.35 From the
later medieval period we also have a number of commentaries, appa-
rently independent from Trevet’s, though the vast majority of them
have hardly been studied so far. Pierre Courcelle was scathing about
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them, including Trevet’s work, but he obviously judged them solely
on the basis of their merits in correctly explaining the text.36 But a
commentary could of course serve more purposes than giving a mere
explanation of the text, and it is often a good barometer of intellectual
and institutional developments of the time.
will iam of aragon
This can clearly be seen in the case of William of Aragon’s commen-
tary, extant in at least five MSS.37 In all likelihood the commentary
predates Trevet’s work; the once usual date of 1335 was based on a
misreading of the colophon in oneMS.38 It is an original work, taking
a somewhat different approach from that of Conches and Trevet.
William’s Aristotelian reading of the Consolation is underscored
by his exclamations that ‘Boethius knew Aristotle very well’ and
that we should not impute to him the crimina Platonicorum.39 He
frequently brings down the Platonic atmosphere of Boethius’ text to
the Aristotelian world of sense, suppressing the Platonic overtones
for instance in 3.m9.18, where Boethius says: ‘You bring forth, with
the same bases, souls and lesser living beings.’ According to William
of Aragon, some have interpreted this as referring to the souls of good
and bad angels (calodemones and cacodemones) on the one hand
and human souls on the other, but William concludes that Boethius
must have meant the souls of men and those of animals and plants:
‘Because we have no philosophical experience of these other souls,
we should not impute this [doctrine] to such a philosopher.’40 But
William was not the anti-Platonist that modern scholars, without
having the full text at their disposal, have taken him to be. He quotes
from Proclus’ Elementatio theologica (inWilliam ofMoerbeke’s trans-
lation) and the Liber de causis, and refers to Hermes Trismegistus.41
Without referring to the notion of the soul’s pre-existence, William
claims that for Plato recollection is the process of learningwhich starts
with the soul’s first principles, fromwhich knowledge of all things can
be derived. Through deduction from these first principles potential
knowledge is turned into actual knowledge: ‘Hence, when we read
Boethius in this way, we should not condemn Boethius or Plato.’42
On the question whether Plato and Boethius did not consider the body
to be an impediment to intellectual cognition William simply states
that he believes that Plato, when speaking about bodily impediment,
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referred to the soul’s perfect knowledge after its separation from the
body, for in this life the body is a natural companion to the soul and a
sine qua non for intellectual activities. In view of his reputation as
being an anti-Platonic Aristotelian, it is remarkable to see William
trying to save Plato, without relinquishing his Aristotelian position on
the vital importance of sense perception as the starting point for
intellectual cognition; it is Plato’s followers rather than Plato himself
who are attacked for their crimes (crimina).43 But William simply
ignores the question of how the soul can arrive at its perfect knowledge
in a life without a body. And elsewhere he interprets the spatial
character of the descent, by which the soul becomes less free, in
terms of an ever increasing dependence on the body. The terminology
of descendere (descend), cadere (fall) and labi (glide down) is adopted
but stripped of its Platonic overtones. William of Aragon blandly
claims that his interpretation of Boethius’s words shows that those
who have argued that Boethius is speaking here about a descent of the
soul have misunderstood the text.44
Thus, like William of Conches and Nicholas Trevet, William of
Aragon interprets the descent in terms of an ever closer dependence
of the soul on the body. Though in many details their interpretations
agree, their motivations are not entirely similar. William of Aragon
did not really believe that Boethius needed to be rescued from heter-
odox Platonism, for at root Boethius was a follower of Aristotle, and
even at the level of words Boethius was no genuine Platonist.
some later med ieval commentar i e s
From roughly the same time we have some other lemmatic commen-
taries. We have already mentioned Tholomaeus De Asinariis, a jurist
from Asti, who belonged to the powerful family of the De Asinariis.45
He completed his commentary in 1307, which shows how quickly
Trevet’s work, which is one of its sources, was circulating in Italy.46
Boethius’ fate was congenial to this author, since he too had suffered
personal adversity: as a result of civil strife, culminating in the defeat
of the Ghibelline faction in Asti in 1304, he was exiled from his home
town and lost his properties. In the preface he identifies himself with
Boethius. The work has not been studied, but from the few sentences
published by Courcelle it appears that he duly Christianizes Boethius
without ignoring the fact that Boethius was a Platonist. Thus where
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Boethius leaves open the question whether fate works by divine
spirits acting as servants to providence, or whether the course of fate
is woven by the service of the soul or the whole of nature (6 pr. 6) or by
still other means, Tholomaeus glosses ‘spirits, that is the divine Holy
Spirit’, put in the plural by Boethius ‘because it is a multiple force, viz.
spirit, intellect, counsel, as is said in the Bible’.47
Another commentary, extant in at least nine MSS, was written by
the Dominican scholastic Guglielmo da Cortemilia (Guillermus de
Cortumelia, † 1342).48 It is a huge work, even more extensive than
Trevet’s, on which it seems to be based. Guglielmo suggests that
Boethius speaks the language of the Platonists but without holding
their opinion, for instance on knowledge as recollection to things
known in a previous life.49 This commentary too has hardly been
studied. Less ambitious is the commentary by William Wheteley,
preserved in three MSS, and completed in 1316 when he was rector
of Yatesbury andmaster of Lincoln school. It is a simplified version of
Trevet’s work for the use of his grammar school pupils.50 Some sixty
years later the Flemish schoolmaster Renier of St Truiden wrote a
much more extensive work. It became the source not only for the
‘Ghent Boethius’ – a translation plus massive commentary in Dutch,
printed in 1485 by Arend de Keysere in Ghent – but also for Arnoul
Greban’s commentary dating from the mid fifteenth century; the
latter also incorporated explanations from William of Conches and
Trevet.51
A different kind of commentary was written by Denys the
Carthusian (c.1470). It is written as a dialogue between master
Denys and pupil Joannes, with the text divided into articuli. Denys
explicitly says that his commentary aims at the religious and erudite
men rather than schoolboys.52 The title is significant: Enarrationes
sive Commentaria, by which Denys means that from this text one
can distil philosophical and theological truths.53 His Boethius com-
mentary forms a kind of diptych with his commentary on Pseudo-
Dionysius, for in both works one of the central arguments is that the
human mind, at its highest level, can perceive spiritual realities
intuitively, without having recourse to phantasms. He explicitly
sides here with the Cologne Albertists against Thomistic teaching.54
In the famous passage from 5 pr. 4 Lady Philosophy distinguishes four
different cognitive faculties, sense, imagination, reason and intelli-
gence, and of the last it is said that it transcends the boundaries of the
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created world, gazing ‘on the simple Form with the unsullied sight of
the mind’. While Boethius is clearly referring to the divine mode of
cognition, Denys applies these words to the human intellect. Human
intelligence can contemplate directly spiritual realities such as the
divine ideas, and even the divinity itself. But while Denys uses
Boethius here as a source for a mystic theology of an intuitive con-
templation of God, he is well aware of the more problematic passages
e.g. on the soul and its descent. He says he is not sure whether
Boethius took the notion of the world soul in the same (pagan) way
as Plato did. And if Augustine and Boethius endorsed the pre-
existence of the soul, we should not follow them. Like his predeces-
sors, Denys interprets the soul’s chariot in terms of God’s grace and
spiritual aid.55
quaest iones commentar i e s
The survey so far suggests that Boethius’ place in the curriculum was
in the pre-university years, in the grammar schools and religious
houses before students were sent to the university. But though there
is no evidence that the Consolation belonged to the main stream of
university teaching, it is mentioned in the records of some German
universities of the later medieval period (Erfurt, Prague and Vienna),
and also in a number of ‘Introductions to Philosophy’ (for example in a
thirteenth-century guide to the Parisian Arts courses).56 That it was
frequently read in the universities in the later Middle Ages is also
suggested by the existence of some quaestiones commentaries on
the text. These commentaries consist of a series of questions, derived
from the text of the Consolation, but often loosely connected to it.57
Some of them are of a fairly simple nature, and seem to have served as
vehicles for explaining basic points in logic, epistemology, natural
philosophy and ethics to the young student. The format in answering
a question basically follows scholastic patterns of argumentation, giv-
ing pro and contra arguments and quoting Aristotle as the main auc-
toritas. Of a different kind is Pierre d’Ailly’s question-commentary,
dating from about 1380, which consists of only two quaestiones
on themes derived from the Consolation which were however also
highly relevant in fourteenth-century discussions on the relationship
between natural reason and faith.58 The first consists of eight articles
and discusses, using and quoting a number of scholastic authors,
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‘whether a philosopher, through philosophical enquiry, can achieve
true knowledge of human beatitude by using natural reason’. Siding
with Ockham on the question of beatific vision, his answer is that,
using ‘natural light’ (in naturali lumine), it is probable that human
beatitude can only consist in union of the rational soul with God in
the life hereafter.59 The second question consists of six articles and
deals primarilywith the question ofwhether the contingency of events
can be reconciled with God’s eternal and immutable foreknowledge
of future events. The answer would surely be ‘yes’, but D’Ailly has
apparently run out of time and does not develop his answer.60
However, in this second question he deals with a number of related
issues, often drawing on and quoting extensively from Gregory of
Rimini. He discusses for instance whether God is the author of sin,
the status of astrology, the nature of divine knowledge, the status of
the past (and whether God can undo the past), and chance. Though
hardly surprising, it is interesting to see Boethius featuring in a late
medieval debate on divine knowledge, where he is quoted by Gregory
of Rimini and by D’Ailly in support of the view that there is no
succession, no before and after, and no divine ideas or other interme-
diaries in God by way of which he would know his creatures.61 One
may deplore this use of Boethius, as Courcelle did in his influential
study, but that is to miss an important point: far from showing the
‘defects of the educational system of that time’ (‘les défauts de l’en-
seignement à cette époque’),62 it is a work which testifies to the
importance allotted by scholastics to the Consolation as a primary
source of some important questions concerning divine knowledge and
human free will.
humani sm
At the end of the medieval period humanist modes of reading and
commenting on ancient texts began to prevail. This was to some
extent a natural development from medieval glossing techniques,
and humanists were often indebted to their medieval predecessors
for traditional historical and linguistic explanations.63 As we have
seen, theConsolation had often been a school favourite (especially in
the schools of North-Western Europe), and though the reading of it
had never been limited to the grammar school – it had a widespread
circulation among the laity and at the courts – this was certainly its
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principal place in the curriculum.We should therefore not expect too
wide a gap between the medieval and humanist grammatical com-
mentaries, especially in view of their close links to the schools.
Humanist school teachers, however, laid greater emphasis on gram-
mar and style, often neglecting philosophical issues. Their commen-
taries are often concatenations of notes on words and grammatical
constructions, with occasional glosses on history and mythology. In
Italy this process can already be seen in the commentaries of Pietro da
Muglio († 1383), respected friend of Petrarch and Boccaccio, and, to a
lesser extent, Giovanni Travesio (c.1411).64 In Northern Europe there
are two interesting examples of humanist commentators who will be
briefly discussed here.
Badius Ascensius published his commentary, written for the
schoolboys (aetas imbecillior) in 1498.65 It is predominantly philolo-
gical in nature, but it is not true, as has been claimed, that he dis-
carded themedieval interpretatio christiana, and looked down on the
work of Pseudo-Thomas, whose commentary often accompanied
Badius’ work in print.66 Badius Ascensius often speaks with respect
of Pseudo-Thomas, and even defends him on the latter’s interpreta-
tion of the creation of the souls: when Pseudo-Thomas writes that
souls are created daily in order to be infused into bodies, this should
not be understood as meaning that they are created first and then
united with bodies. Badius Ascensius refers to Augustine, but leaves
the question to theologians for discussion. Boethius’ ‘returning fire’
was glossed by Pseudo-Thomas as charitas, which is not absurd,
Badius Ascensius writes, because it is only charity which can lead
us to heaven. ‘But because all the other things [in this metre] are
couched in Platonic terms, this too can be understood in a Platonic
way’, and Badius Ascensius then proceeds to quote Virgil’s famous
lines on the spirit nourishing heaven, earth and all the rest (Principio
caelum ac terras camposque liquentes, Aeneid 6.724–32) by way of
parallel.
His commentary on 3.m9 is brief and passes over the reference to
the pre-existence of soul. In his comment on 3.m11 he expresses
some reservations about Boethius’s adherence to the Platonic doc-
trine of knowledge as recollection in 3.m11, suggesting that Boethius
does not say that Plato spoke the truth. The very words ‘Plato’smuse’
already suggest that we must look for a different understanding of
these words. Badius Ascensius then gives the traditional explanation
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in terms of the soul’s innate first principles from which potential
knowledge can be actualised. Faced with Boethius’s words ‘I strongly
agree with Plato’ at the beginning of the next section (3 pr. 12), his
answer is basically that Boethius did not accept Plato’s argument in
its entirety (totum illud dictumPlatonis) but only something similar:
namely that knowledge is based on first principles that are innate.
Boethius’ purpose was only to point out that, by the weight of grief,
men could lose their knowledge of things which they had known
previously.
The Dutch commentator Joannes Murmellius, whose work was
published in 1514, bears evenmore clearly the stamp of the work of a
humanistic grammar teacher.67 Like Badius Ascensius, he focuses on
the grammar, style and terminology of Boethius, and shows a critical
attitude to the transmission of the text, which sometimes leads to
emendations. His range of quotations is wider than that of Badius
Ascensius, and these quotations often serve to underline the high
moral–proverbial value of the Consolation. Thus, far from function-
ing solely as literary adornments, these quotations helped to give the
Consolation its place in a wider network of edifying works, which
comprise not only pagan but also Christian literature (including the
Bible), ancient as well as modern. They were the vehicles by which
classical literature was delivered to youth, and they helped to convey
the idea of the compatibility of themoral sayings in all these different
works.
The belief in this compatibility is also reflected in Murmellius’
reluctance to express strong opinions about Boethius’ Platonism vis-
à-vis his Christianity. He himself calls Plato’s Timaeus a ‘very beau-
tiful book’ and a ‘very noble dialogue’, and he notes that ‘“O qui
perpetua”, by far the most beautiful and erudite poem, is almost
exclusively derived from Plato’s Timaeus by Boethius’s admirable
genius’.68 His commentary on these verses consists for a large part
of long quotations from the Timaeus in the translation of Ficino (he
quotes regularly from Ficino’s works). At one point he addresses the
reader saying that, although Plato’s opinions on theworld soul and on
souls of lesser beings are not approved by all Christians, ‘Boethian
Philosophy follows Plato carefully and prudently’, and that in turn
he, Murmellius, ‘will expound carefully the elements of Platonic
doctrine’. Murmellius then gives a brief catalogue of opinions on
the question of whether heavenly bodies are animated, which must
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confirm the same point, namely that Christian faith is neutral on this
issue: witness the positions of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.69
Only in 3.m11 does he criticise the Platonic doctrine of the pre-
existence of the soul as ‘most vane’ (vanissimum); Plato is said to
have used ‘the highest and incredible eloquence’ (summa et incred-
ibili eloquentia) when he spoke about the notion of knowledge as
recollection, and the authority of Augustine (‘of all mortals by far the
wisest’) is invoked, though not quoted, to refute this “Platonicum
dogma”.70The notion of recollection of knowledge is explained along
traditional lines: the soul would have known all the things it could
possibly know, if the body had not weighed it down.71 And the
Boethian ‘seed of truth’, remaining in the soul after embodiment, is
described as a certain principle and starting point, from which man is
suited to perceive truth and acquire knowledge.72 Yet it is clear from
the ample quotations from Plato and Platonic authors such as Ficino,
as well as from the non-committal way in which they are often
presented, that Murmellius considers his role as commentator to
consist primarily in clarifying philological points and providing sour-
ces (from which moral lessons could be drawn) rather than in giving
verdicts on the doctrinal soundness of the opinions expressed in the
text. Thus, in his comments on 5 pr. 2 where Boethius alludes to the
pre-existence of souls, Murmellius simply writes that this is taken
from Plato, without trying to give it a Christian reading, and the same
is true for his comments on other such passages (e.g. on 5 pr. 3).
after the rena i s sance
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the range of texts
was immensely wider than 500 years before, the Consolation was of
course no longer one of the foundational texts in the republic of
letters. Nevertheless, it remained a popular work which attracted
learned commentaries from scholars such as Johannes Bernartius,73
Theodorus Sitzmannus, Petrus Bertius and Renatus Vallinus.
They apparently did not feel the urge to rescue Boethius from his
association with pagan ideas. Occasionally, a critical note is struck,
for instance when Sitzmannus admonishes the reader to peruse
Arnobius’ Adversus nationes, ‘from which it can be learnt that the
Platonic dogma [namely on knowledge as recollection] is not without
absurdity’,74 but in general Boethius’ Platonism is taken for granted
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without any criticism and its sources quoted in a neutral, non-
committal way. Vallinus offers an historical argument why Boethius
spoke of light chariots which brought souls down from the stars. He
interprets these chariots as the souls’ astral bodies. It would be amaz-
ing indeed, Vallinus writes, if this doctrine, which is so contrary to the
Christian doctrine, would have influenced Christian thinkers and
especially the ‘Catholic philosophy of Boethius’, were it not for the
fact that only at the fifth synod, that is, many years after the death of
Boethius, was it condemned alongside other errors of Origen (that is, at
the Second Council of Constantinople in 553; but there had been ear-
lier condemnations, which Vallinus does not mention). Alternatively,
Boethius might simply have meant, following Themistius’ interpreta-
tion of Plato’swords, that the vehiclewas nothing other than the soul’s
ingenium.75 Vallinus must have been one of the first who interpreted
this verse correctly in terms of astral bodies.76
The presence of these heterodox opinions was the very reason why
some thinkers felt attracted to the Consolation. Leibniz, who made
a summary of Books 1 and 2 of the Consolation, wrote that his friend
F.M. van Helmont ‘had a special affection for this book [i.e. the
Consolation] because he believes he can find traces of Pythagorean
ideas in it’.77VanHelmont’s friend, the cabbalist Christian Knorr von
Rosenroth, was also interested in theConsolation for this reason, and
translated it into German. But here, not for the first time, we enter
into terra incognita.Much remains to be studied of the rich and varied
Nachleben of Boethius’masterpiece.78
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